Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, by Louis Henkin Book Review by Horwitz, Paul
Alabama Law Scholarly Commons 
Essays, Reviews, and Shorter Works Faculty Scholarship 
1997 
Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, by Louis 
Henkin Book Review 
Paul Horwitz 
University of Alabama - School of Law, phorwitz@law.ua.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_essays 
Recommended Citation 
Paul Horwitz, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, by Louis Henkin Book Review, 35 Colum. 
J. Transnat'l L. 723 (1997). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_essays/32 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Essays, Reviews, and Shorter Works by an authorized 
administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly Commons. 
Book Review
Foreign Affairs and the
United States Constitution,
by Louis Henkin.
Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 1996.
Pp. 582, lxxii.
Paul Horwitz*
This is a propitious time for Professor Henkin to release a second,
much-revised version of his treatise. I When the first edition of Foreign
Affairs and the Constitution appeared in 1972,2 the United States was
still embroiled in a conflict which was but one especially heated branch
of a long-running Cold War. Foreign policy could and did capture
public attention. At the same time, while the Supreme Court had seen
the passing of the Warren Court and the ascendance of the Burger
Court, few of the Court's basic premises had changed; the Court
continued to accept the virtually unlimited federal power that
characterized the post-New Deal era, while intervening where a claim
could be framed to invoke the equally substantial power of the Bill of
Rights.
In many respects, the opposite condition prevails today: we now
exist in a state of relative calm in the conduct of American foreign
affairs, and relative flux in American constitutional law. To be sure, the
fractionation of the post-Cold War world, the revival or continuation of
bitter ethnic and nationalist conflicts, and the growth of global trade
have made the foreign affairs agenda more crowded than ever. Some of
these issues may touch us more directly than did the overarching issues
of the nuclear age.' But if there are more (and more complex) problems
to be faced, they are also smaller. No single issue of ultimate
* LL.M. Columbia University School of Law, 1997; LL.B. University of Toronto
Faculty of Law, 1995; M.S. Columbia Graduate School of Journalism, 199 1; B.A. McGill
University, 1990.
1. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed.
1996).
2. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
3. See William D. Rogers, Epilogue, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
190, 193 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter FOREIGN AFFAIRS].
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consequence shapes our foreign affairs or captivates the public as the
Cold War once could.4
By contrast, the tumult in the field of constitutional law is
becoming ever more significant. The reasonably settled picture of the
extent and division of federal and state powers that stood for decades is
now in some doubt. The breadth of Congress' ability to legislate under
the Commerce Clause5 or rely on the negative Commerce Clause,6 its
ability to compel state cooperation with federal schemes7 or impose
remedies on the states under the Fourteenth Amendment,8 the ability to
offer federal judicial relief against the states despite the tangled
jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment'-new trends in all these
areas have unsettled our assumptions about the balance of American
governmentalpower. It is right that we should take this time to assess
where things stand in this particular outpost of constitutional law, and
flag the legal issues that may come to trouble us at home or abroad.
The new edition, now entitled Foreign Affairs and the United
States Constitution, performs this useful task admirably, as admirers of
Professor Henkin and the first edition of his treatise will not be
surprised to discover. It is a clear and careful guide to the field.
Though Henkin has enriched his study with "nuances in analysis and
refinement in exposition"'" occasioned by a quarter-century's
developments, this edition follows largely from the first. With the vast
array of endnotes that update and buttress the main text, the treatise
seems almost to be two books. One wishes, in fact, that the two halves
of the book-the main text and the extensive notes that follow-could
have been better integrated, and that the whole could have been indexed
more fully.
As with the first edition, Professor Henkin is quick to recognize
that much of the law of foreign affairs under the Constitution is not
4. See Jane E. Stromseth, Udderstanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why
Methodology Matters, 106 YALEL.J. 845, 911 (1996) (book review) (noting the cooling of the
"sense of crisis and emergency that pervaded the Cold War years" and the rise of more complex
and varied security issues facing the United States).
5. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1614
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7. See New York v. United States, 504 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 117 S.
Ct. 2365 (1997).
8. See City ofBoeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
9. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
10. HENKIN, supra note 1, at x.
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settled in the courts," but in the conflicts and compromises that
characterize Congressional and Executive Branch relations. Moreover,
despite the importance of foreign affairs to the Framers of the
Constitution, whose efforts were impelled in great measure by the
inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation to provide for effective
control over foreign affairs by the Continental Congress,12 the
Constitution "seems a strange, laconic document'"' with respect to
foreign affairs, offering relatively little guidance on how and whether
the power over this area is to be divided. Accordingly, Henkin offers
more than a tour of the sparse case law, drawing instead on two
centuries of disputed practice by the political branches.
Under the circumstances, Henkin must often provide somewhat
inconclusive discussions of continuing controversies, while gently
advancing his own view on each matter. Of the War Powers
Resolution, for example, which emerged in the wake of his first edition,
Henkin writes that the Resolution, though poorly drafted, is
constitutional "in principle" as a restriction on Executive action, but in
practice has been evaded by Presidents seeking to engage in military
action that constitutes war or acts short of war.14 At the same time,
Henkin notes that despite the legislation's apparent ineffectiveness,"
Congress has not acted to shore up its war powers, as it could,16 and
Presidents have at least "attend[ed] to" the Resolution despite their
claims that they were free to disregard it.17
Similarly, of the constitutionality of recent military incursions
launched by the President without the clear prior sanction of Congress,
Henkin notes that "the realities of national life have rendered
constitutional issues hypothetical, for it is increasingly difficult to make
an authentic case that the President had taken the country into war
without Congressional authorization in advance or ratification soon
after."' 8 And while Henkin concedes that the United States has the
power (if not the right) to violate treaties, the United Nations Charter,
and other sources of international law,19 he makes a strong argument
11. See, e.g., id. at 3-4.
12. See id. at vii; Jack N. Rakove, Making Foreign Policy-The View From 1787, in
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONSTITUTON I (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990).
13. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 13.
14. See id. at 107-08.
15. See id. at 10.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 320 n.*.
18. Id. at 99.
19. See id. at 196, 251.
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that only those actions of the President or his delegates that are pursuant
to an exercise of some specific Presidential power may constitute a
"controlling executive act ' 2 sufficient to override international law,"1
and concludes that the courts must "revisit[ ] the reverence of the
Framers for the Law of Nations" and establish the "clear and honorable
place [of customary international law] in our constitutional life." '22 In
these and other areas, Henkin threads his way carefully through the
"issues of conflict and cooperation in a 'twilight zone' of uncertain or
perhaps concurrentpower ' 2 shared by the political branches and largely
immune from judicial intervention.
Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution is, as I have
suggested, a careful and measured analysis of the constitutional law of
foreign affairs. But for all its caution, there is underneath a striking
sense of optimism that the Constitution, this "unique, home-built
contraption '24 that has governed our conduct of foreign affairs for 200
years, can work successfully.25  "[I]mproved operation and
cooperation '26 by the political branches, not a diminution of federal
foreign affairs power, should be the watchwords, Henkin argues. There
is a strong faith throughout this treatise that the Constitution need not
act as a "straitjacket," 7 hobbling national efforts to participate fully in
international organizations such as the United Nations, or to conclude
treaties that expand the reach of international human rights.
Rather, Henkin advances his belief that "creative legal imagination
can find ways and suggest means to bring such arrangements largely
within a dynamic, flexible, hospitable Constitution."'2 A proselytizer's
spirit is evident here, barely concealed beneath layers of careful
analysis. That faith in the promise of international law is evident in his
development of arguments on the importance and binding nature of
treaties and customary international law,29 his encouragement of
20. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
21. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 244-45 (criticizing Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446
(llth Cir. 1986)).
22. Id. at 246.
23. Id. at 68 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
24. Id. at319.
25. It is not an untempered optimism, however. See, e.g., id. at 314, 316.
26. Id. at 321.
27. Id. at 254.
28. Id. at 273.
29. See generally id. ohs. 7-8.
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cooperation rather than conflict between Congress and the President,"
his arguments for the appeal and constitutionality of Congressional-
Executive agreements,3 and in any number of other discussions in this
work.
How might the major premises and positions of Foreign Affairs
and the United States Constitution begin to differ or diverge from
current developments in the field of constitutional law, if not
specifically that of foreign affairs? That is, if the appearance of a
second edition of Henkin's treatise consolidates developments in the last
quarter-century of constitutional law as they touch on foreign affairs,
how might it differ from those trends we now see emerging, which
might reshape an eventual third edition of the book? One change might
be in methodology. Henkin shifts with ease among the most popular
canonical methods of constitutional interpretation, deriving as much
meaning as possible from the text and structure of the Constitution
despite the relative sparsity of its references to foreign affairs, turning
here and there to the debates of the Framers, and mostly relying on two
centuries of actual practice. But as originalist arguments continue to
find favor in the courts and space in the academic literature, and as the
canons of "text, history, structure, traditions"32 are applied with an air
of dogmatic confidence in their ability to ferret out the right answer,33
a more rigid and less fluid approach to interpretation of the foreign
affairs powers may prevail. In particular, if the courts become more
inclined to speak to foreign affairs issues, one might expect them to pay
greater attention to the early history of foreign affairs than does Henkin,
who is more concerned with subsequent practice.34
More significant, however, is the recent resurgence in the courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, of a focus on the boundedness of
government, on the limits on the power of the political institutions that
make up the United States. Most of these recent developments have
centered on the balance of federal-state power rather than the balance of
30. See, e.g., id. at 321.
31. Seeid. at217-18.
32. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment
Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1723 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370 (Scalia, J.) ("Because there is no constitutional text
speaking to this precise question, the answer to the [petitioners'] challenge must be sought in
historical understanding and practice, in the structure of this Constitution, and in the
jurisprudence of this Court.").
34. Certainly the current scholarly literature often shows such a focus. See generally
Stromseth, supra note 4, at 852-53 (collecting recent sources); William Michael Treanor, Fame,
the Founders, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 695 (1997).
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power within the federal government. As Henkin points out, "the
constitutional law of foreign affairs is principally the law of allocation
of authority within the federal government."35  Within the federal
government itself, whether one relies on Justice Sutherland's opinion in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation36 or on the simple
fact of the post-New Deal expansion of federal power, there is little
doubt that the political branches have substantial power to act in the
field of foreign affairs, even if which branch has that power is not
always clear.37 Thus, at first blush it may seem that the growth of the
"dual sovereignty" approach to federalism38 does not much affect the
overall sovereign power of the United States to act in foreign affairs.
But the themes sounded by these cases-the importance of preserving
the constitutional plan that made lawmaking difficult and multi-
voiced,39 of setting branches of government in oppositionto one another
while guarding the power of each against intrusion,4" and of the
boundedness of power in general4 '-may yet insinuate themselves into
the courts' treatment of foreign affairs and introduce greater limits on
the federal ability to act in this arena.
Despite Henkin's exhortations in favor of a cooperative and active
federal involvement in foreign affairs, these developments may have
some appeal of their own. In this as in many other works over the
course of his career, Henkin emphasizes the importance of human
rights, both under the Constitution and under international law.42 As he
notes, in the original conception of the Constitution one of the central
bulwarks of rights protection was the separation and limitation of
powers.43 The resurgent interest in the limitations imposed by
35. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 7. See also id. at 134, 149; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Book
Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 494, 508 (1973) (reviewing the first edition of FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION).
36. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
37. See HENKiN, supra note 1, at 20-22.
38. See, e.g., Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2365.
39. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 175 (noting that the foreign affairs power has long been
an area of such concern, and that the Framers wished to make it difficult to "conclude treaties
lightly or widely").
40. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 115
S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
41. See, e.g., Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2157; Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2365; Lopez, 514 U.S. at
549.
42. See HENKIN, supra note 1, ch. 9. See also LouIs HENiN, CONSTrrUTIONALISM,
DEmOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAiRs, ch. 4 (1990). See generally Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF
RIGHTs (1990).
43. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 278.
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federalism, if applied in the foreign affairs arena, might yet serve as a
supplement to the protections offered by the Bill of Rights.
Alternatively, it might simply suggest that in an era of splintered goals
and views about how the United States ought to conduct itself abroad,
it makes sense to emphasize those aspects of the Constitutionalstructure
that make state action difficult. Similarly, the revival of interest in state
power, if it eventually finds an echo in foreign affairs law, may simply
reflect the greater role presently played by states, cities, and other
internal political entities on the world stage."
This renewed emphasis on some of the limits of power might, if
applied to the foreign affairs arena, require some additional ground
rules. Some of these are suggested by Henkin: an overarching
supremacy of federal foreign affairs laws over state law; a respect for
human rights; and a greater awareness of and respect for international
law, both treaty-made and customary.45 Beyond this, one might hope
that courts would become less reluctant arbiters of structural
constitutional issues involving foreign affairs, not just issues involving
individual rights. Though he favors judicial involvement where
individual rights are at stake, Henkin calls efforts to use the courts to
police the boundaries between the President and Congress "misguided,"
at least where there are no clear objections from either branch.46 As
long as the courts take the limits of constitutional power seriously and
view it as another method of protecting rights, however, they ought to
play a more active role here. Though foreign affairs issues have
frequently seen the employment of all the courts' tools of avoidance,47
it would be consistent with their renewed interest in policing the powers
of government actors to grasp some of the nettlesome issues in this
field, too.
Of course, there is excellent reason to believe that the courts will
continue to avoid the fray as much as possible in the future, leaving the
continuing play of conflict and compromise between the political
branches that Henkin describes. Where the courts refuse to draw a clear
map of how much power is held-and by whom-in the field of foreign
44. See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 115.
45. Cf Patrick D. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
4 (1995).
46. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 316.
47. See Lowenfeld, supra note 35, at 506 ("All the doctrines that lead courts not to decide
cases find a home in the field of foreign affairs."). Such doctrines include rules of standing and
ripeness, the political question doctrine, and sovereign immunity. See Norman Dorsen, Foreign
Affairs and Civil Liberties, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 134, 137.
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affairs, we will continue to need an experienced guide. The second
edition of Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution certainly
fills that role superbly.
